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Abstract 
 
The locus of value creation and innovation in the 
software industry is shifting more and more to platform 
ecosystems on which numerous developers create 
extensions with additional functionalities based on the 
platforms core architecture. While such 
complementors may strongly profit from platforms, 
there are considerable costs. Recent studies therefore 
examined the costs of fitting apps to the specifications 
of certain platforms; however, these works largely 
neglect costs arising from the transactional 
relationship between platform and complementor. In 
order to shed light on this, our work examines how 
design choices of platform governance and app 
architecture impact the emergence of four types of 
cost-inducing hazards within the transactional context 
of the ecosystem. By using a configurational approach 
based on fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis 
(FsQCA), we display complex interactional effects of 
the causal conditions on complementors’ perception of 
hazardous environments and thus provide valuable 
insights for both practice and theory on platform 
ecosystems. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The emergence of digital platforms like 
Salesforce´s Force.com or SAP´s HANA substantially 
changed the logic of innovation in the software 
industry. Contrary to traditional approaches of software 
engineering, modern software development strongly 
relies on innovation from third-party developers, called 
complementors [15]. The platform owner (e.g SAP) 
provides an expandable resource base, which enables 
other actors to develop applications that extend the 
basic functionality of the platform. As a result, an 
ecosystem emerges around the platform in which 
platform owners and third-party developers interact in 
complex ways. In such systems, the innovative 
performance of single firms is not only determined by 
the innovative capabilities of a single firm, but 
considerably influenced by the properties of the 
surrounding ecosystem [45]. 
An essential task of a platform owner is therefore to 
attract complementors to join the ecosystem and 
thereby facilitate innovation and the generation of 
complementary value propositions [5]. The 
predominant current recipe to achieve this is by 
creating and offering motivational factors and 
relational rents [8, 19]. However, famous examples 
like Blackberry´s mobile operating system show that 
gaining solid traction among third-party developers 
remains challenging. Often, platform ecosystems are 
suffering fluctuation and high rates of desertion [35, 
36].  
A currently under-researched explanation for this 
low traction and high rates of fluctuation may lie in the 
fact that complementors face considerable costs when 
joining a specific platform. If these costs are too high, 
they can rapidly outweigh the additional value 
generated by the ecosystem and provoke 
complementors’ abandonment of a platform [44]. 
Previous studies that addressed this question primarily 
took a technical perspective and focused solely on the 
coordination costs related to platform dependencies 
[35, 36]. However, to provide a more holistic analysis 
of costs related to development activity on a platform, 
also economic dimensions need to be considered. In 
this context, transaction cost theory (TCT) is one of the 
most prominent theoretical bases to explain and predict 
relationships and boundary decisions associated with 
interfirm exchange [2, 41]. From the perspective of 
TCT, joining a platform might induce a cost 
disadvantage relative to vertically integrated structures. 
These costs can take different forms (e.g. search and 
information costs; investments in social relations; 
opportunity costs) which are mainly determined by 
four potential hazards: behavioral uncertainty 
concerning the platform owner, technological and 
market uncertainty as well as asset specificity [29]. To 
understand fluctuation in platform ecosystems, it is 
therefore beneficial to take one step back and examine 
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what causes the emergence of these four potential 
hazards from the perspective of an individual 
complementor.  
Within this paper, we develop the overarching idea 
that specificity, behavioral, technological and market 
uncertainty are mainly influenced by design choices 
taken by the platform owner as well as the individual 
third-party developer. In particular, the interplay of the 
control modes applied to govern the surrounding 
ecosystem as well as the micro-architecture of single 
apps will affect the extent to which the developer faces 
cost-inducing hazards. As past research highlighted the 
complex interplay of platform governance and app 
micro architecture [35, 36], we decided not to rely on 
regression-based net effect models but to apply 
configurational theory and qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) to this end. In doing so, we are able to 
capture complex combinatorial causal effects “in 
which an outcome may follow from several different 
combinations of causal conditions” ([28]: p. 23). This 
point of view is grounded in configurational theory and 
allows us to apply a different paradigmatic lens for 
understanding the complexities of platforms and 
ecosystems [10]. In all, we aim at answering the 
following research question: 
 Which configurations of architectural choices and 
platform governance mechanisms minimize asset 
specificity, behavioral uncertainty, technological and 
market uncertainty in platform ecosystems? 
 
2. Conceptual background 
2.1. Transaction costs from a third-party 
developer’s perspective  
 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) [42, 43] provides 
indications that by entering partnerships third-party 
development might induce a cost disadvantage relative 
to vertically integrated structures of software 
development [44]. Such costs can arise due to certain 
patterns of human behavior and characteristics of the 
transaction environment [42, 43]. As human decision 
making is characterized by bounded rationality, i.e. an 
individual´s limitation in information processing and 
rational decision making due to constraints on their 
cognitive capabilities, occasions in which opportunistic 
behavior might be favorable naturally emerge [42]. 
Turning to the context of platform ecosystems, such 
potential hidden agendas bear considerable risk for 
complementors, especially as the development on a 
certain platform oftentimes involves high amounts of 
up-front investments or commitments [44]. For 
instance, knowledge leakage and imitation of own 
software solutions may threaten the complementor’s 
ability to create appropriable rents from these 
investments [24]. As a consequence, third-party 
developers will make further investments in order to 
decrease such hazards, e.g. by acquiring intellectual 
property rights and legal support [8]. The likelihood 
and amount of potential losses due to opportunistic 
behavior in the ecosystem is to a large part determined 
by the transaction environment [42]. Therefore, the 
amount of transaction costs that a complementor is 
willing to accept mirrors the perceived degrees of the 
four main determinants of transaction costs, namely 
asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty on behalf of 
the partner, as well as technological and market 
uncertainty [29]. 
Asset specificity: The concept of asset specificity 
describes the degree to which an investment will lose 
value if the resource must be adopted for other 
purposes. Specific assets are significantly more 
valuable in a particular exchange relationship than 
within alternative partner relations and lead to a ‘lock-
in’ effect to a certain platform [41]. If a complementor 
has to spend significant amounts of time and money in 
order to create tailored procedures, routines and 
systems concerning one particular platform, these 
“sunk” investments are likely to be of no value in the 
face of migrating to another platform [46]. 
Consequently, if a complementor perceives high levels 
of asset specificity it will expect high transaction costs. 
Behavioral uncertainty: Second, behavioral 
uncertainty arises from the instance that partnership 
evaluation is often complex and the partner’s actions 
and performance are hard to evaluate [29]. This can be 
further strengthened if the partner refuses to share 
information, disguises or distorts it [34]. Particularly 
within the context of platforms, there are quite 
asymmetric relationships between platform owners and 
complementors [7] so that a large part of the costs 
emerging from behavioral uncertainty is on the 
complementors’ side. So, the less predictable the 
platform owner’s behaviors are, the more 
complementors will perceive the necessity to invest in 
corresponding safeguards. 
Technological uncertainty: Third, technological 
uncertainty as one key dimensions of environmental 
turbulence refers to the unpredictability of the firm's 
environment. While technological evolution is 
unpredictable in principle [37], complementors 
furthermore face technological uncertainties especially 
because it is the platform owner who sets crucial 
technological framing conditions like for instance 
APIs, SDKs, system governance (component 
boundaries and real-time support) and shared assets 
(e.g., maps, fields for data input-output) [6]. These may 
heavily influence the value and functionality of new 
and existing apps. Third-party developers therefore 
face an adaptation problem and might be forced to 
adjust internal resources, external agreements and 
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especially the relationship towards the platform owner 
in order to fit the new external circumstances [29]. 
Hence, on the one hand, the less predictable the 
technological surroundings are, the more likely are up-
front investments to make agreements adaptive. On the 
other hand, uncertainty may induce opportunistic 
behavior by the platform owner, e.g. through extracting 
concessions at the partner’s expense [40]. The 
consequence of this is a propensity of higher 
transaction costs. 
Market uncertainty: Volatility of market conditions 
(e.g. market, demand, and competitive environment) is 
the second dimension of environmental uncertainty. 
This volatility represents a crucial source of cost for 
complementors, as for instance the sustainability of 
their specific niche is required for them to succeed 
[26]. In the context of platforms, the degree of market 
uncertainty quite strongly depends on the 
characteristics of the platform. As the platform 
mediates the relationship between end users, the 
complementor and its peers, platform design choices 
such as licensing policies or the provision of 
technological support may considerably influence the 
volatility in platform entrance, desertion or competitive 
behavior [9]. Facing these obstacles, complementors 
are confronted with another type of adaptation problem 
which analogously to technological uncertainty might 
induce higher costs. 
 
2.2. Platform governance and app 
microarchitecture as configurational antecedents of 
cost-inducing hazards 
 
Fig. 1 illustrates the framework of this research. It 
proposes that the configuration of platform governance 
mechanisms and app microarchitecture influences a 
complementor´s transaction costs in platform 
ecosystems [37]. Rather than relying on conventional 
reductionistic models, we assume that a specific 
outcome depends on the configuration of variables 
rather than the net effects of the individual factors. 
This approach is suitable for the context of our 
research for two reasons.  
On the one hand, configurational approaches treat 
sets of variables as single predictors [25]. These serve 
to simultaneously explain the outcome of interest so 
that configurational theory is well suited to uncover 
synergetic and complementary effects [28]. This 
resonates well with current theoretical perspectives on 
platform and ecosystem management. These highlight 
the inseparability of platform governance from app 
architecture in their mutual effect on organizational 
outcomes. For instance, Tiwana [35, 36] shows that the 
evolutionary capabilities of a platform are catalyzed by 
the level of input control because app modularization 
by itself is not sufficient to accelerate evolution as 
every change of the extension requires guaranteeing 
interoperability and quality standards of the ecosystem. 
Each variable in isolation therefore has no robust effect 
on this outcome.  
On the other hand, configurational theories assume 
asymmetric rather than symmetric relations between 
conditional and outcomes variables [10]. This implies 
equifinality between different initial conditions and 
development paths [28]. Consequently, conditions may 
either be sufficient or necessary causes of a dependent 
variable. According to both organizational [12] and 
information systems research [23] such notions 
superiorly accommodate organizational realities. As 
El-Sawy et al. [10] point out, this perspective therefore 
particularly fits the purpose of analyzing the 
organization of digital ecosystems.  
 
Figure 1. Research framework 
 
In the selection of our causal conditions, we follow 
notions of Tiwana et al. [37] and Tiwana [35] on IT 
and especially intraplatform dynamics. The former 
outline three core mechanisms of how to execute IS 
governance: decision rights, control and system 
architecture. Building on this foundation, Tiwana [35] 
outlines the inseparability of these mechanisms as 
predictors of platform outcomes. In line with previous 
work that focuses on the influence of governance on 
transaction costs, we therefore rely on configurations 
of these three governance dimensions to explain cost-
inducing hazards [2]. We operationalize platform 
governance as both the control mechanisms and the 
locus of decision rights within the relationships 
between platform owner and the individual third-party 
developers. In the context of platforms, such 
governance mechanisms are usually designed and 
introduced by the platform owner and are not 
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necessarily suited to reduce costs bilaterally. While 
certain mechanisms may allow the platform owner to 
minimize asset specificity and uncertainty, some of 
those may simultaneously increase the transaction 
costs of complementors. Still, also third-party 
developers possess design alternatives based on which 
they can influence their relation to the platform. 
Concretely, the microarchitecture (in contrast to the 
macro architecture of the overall platform) of their 
apps allows complementors to minimize costs by 
exploiting benefits of modularization of the linkages 
between the platform and the app [35, 36]. Summing 
up these insights, our set of causal conditions 
encompasses the most commonly applied IS 
governance forms on platforms. It includes design 
elements from control (clan control, input control), 
decision rights partitioning (centralization of decision 
rights) as well as architecture (app decoupling and 
standardized interfaces). 
The first dimension, control, refers to the 
mechanisms established by a platform owner that 
govern actions of the partners. Decision rights as the 
second dimension of platform governance encompass 
extension app features, functionality, design, and 
implementation procedures [34, 35]. Both elements 
represent design choices which are largely on the 
behalf of the platform owner. 
Clan control: The most common informal 
mechanism to govern partners and the interaction 
within an ecosystem is clan control. This form of 
control is accomplished by mutual values and shared 
goals between the “clan” of complementors and the 
platform owner [17]. For instance, platform owners 
may release norms, mutual values and goals that are 
beneficial for the platform. When either a 
complementor or the platform owner shows deviant 
behavior, other members of the clan might react with 
social sanctioning. On the dyadic level, clan control 
therefore results in behaviors of both the platform 
owner and the complementor that would not violate 
such values by acting opportunistically. As a result, 
levels of uncertainty for the complementor will be 
reduced if clan control is prevalent within the platform 
ecosystem.  
Input control: A suitable formal control mechanism 
for platform ecosystems is input control. It describes 
the degree to which platform owners control 
complementary apps by utilizing application and 
selection processes [35]. Hence, not all complementary 
apps are admitted to the ecosystem. Input control keeps 
tabs on the admission to the ecosystem and allows the 
platform owner to guarantee interoperability, quality or 
the fit with the platform’s interests, values, and 
positioning [36].  
 Centralization of decision rights: Apart from 
different modes of control, another central element of 
platform governance is the degree to which decision 
rights are centralized or delegated [36]. This form of 
governance encompasses different classes of decision 
rights [11]. Taken to the platform context, platform 
owners distribute decisions about what an app should 
do (e.g., features and functionality), how it should do it 
(e.g., design, user interface), and the control of 
boundary resources (e.g. the platform´s interfaces) 
among itself and the complementors [36]. Though 
platform owners are often willing to delegate decision 
rights to complementors because these possess 
nuanced knowledge about the app’s means and ends, in 
the case of strategically relevant extensions, owners 
may decide to keep or retract that authority [35, 36]. 
While the mode of platform governance represents 
a design choice on the behalf of the platform owner, 
the individual complementors may choose 
corresponding design elements on their own [35, 36]. 
Thereby, app modularization is focusing on linkages 
between the platform and the app, which is defined as 
the “degree to which an app is loosely coupled and 
interacts through standardized interfaces with the 
platform.” ([34]: p. 268). In general, modularity 
reduces the complementor’s specific investments in 
knowledge and technologies that are bound to a certain 
platform and thus, in line with previous literature on 
modularity [3], we thus assume that modularization 
reduces transaction costs. The architectural concept of 
modularization can be theoretically described along 
two distinctive dimensions: decoupling of an app from 
the platform, and the use standardized interfaces as 
linkage [31].  
App decoupling: The level of decoupling describes 
an architecture in which changes within the 
architecture of the platform do not have any ripple 
effect on the single app. The more decoupled an app is, 
the more independently it can be developed by a 
complementor while still ensuring fluent interoperation 
with the platform. Usually, the complementor makes 
such a design choice within the exogenous constraints 
of the platform and minimizes the platform 
dependencies on the minimal degree to which an app is 
required to be conforming to the specifications 
interface [35]. This is achieved by carefully selecting 
and placing “thin connections” between app and 
platform while removing the remaining ones so that 
changes to the app or the platform do not condition 
changes to the respective counterpart [39]. 
Standardization of interfaces: On the other hand, 
the standardization of interfaces describes the degree to 
which the linkages between the single app and the 
platform are stable, formalized and well-documented 
[36]. Thereby, stability is ensured by the existence of 
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boundary resources like application programming 
interfaces (APIs) [36]. Such standards codify the 
relationships between the app and the platform as well 
as clearly articulate rules and specifications for apps 
and platform infrastructure. Such clarity and 
transparency might help to overcome issues of 
opportunism and bounded rationality, so that 
transaction costs can be reduced. 
 
3. Research methodology 
3.1. Data collection 
 
The sampling frame of our research consists of 750 
firms equally distributed among the complementors of 
five leading cloud platforms (i.e. Microsoft Azure, 
Oracle Cloud Platform, Amazon Web Services, SAP 
HANA, and Salesforce Force.com). The platforms 
were chosen for two reasons. First, they are all well-
established and have a solid traction among 
complementors. Second, due to their size and high 
level of power imbalance, they perfectly meet our 
requirements for analyzing asymmetric third-party 
relationship and the corresponding risk. 
Congruent with previous surveys of third-party 
innovators [4], we utilized a web-crawling approach 
which randomly collected contact data from the 
platforms´ app stores. A link to the online 
questionnaire was sent via mail and recipients were 
asked to forward the questionnaire to high-level 
executives (C-level; IT executives) as key informants 
[20]. The invitation mail and the start page of our 
survey included the purpose of the study and ensured 
confidentiality and anonymity to the participants. 
Our sampling approach resulted in a total of N=42 
valid cases (response rate: 5.6 percent), which is a 
common response rate in such settings. We assessed 
non-response bias by comparing response of early and 
late respondents [1]. T-tests between the means of the 
early and late respondents did not reveal any 
significant differences (p > 0.05), hence rejecting the 
presence of non-response bias in our study. 
Complementors in our study were distributed 
among all five platforms (Microsoft Azure: 9; Oracle 
Cloud Platform: 4; Amazon Web Services: 2; SAP 
HANA: 9; and Salesforce Force.com: 14). Most of our 
respondents were high-level executives (C-level: 71.4 
percent; BU executives: 19 percent). Participants in our 
sample indicated that they are highly experienced in 
this topic (>10 years: 83.3 percent) and were experts in 
the context of our survey (95.2 percent). 
 
3.2. Measurement validation 
 
We used a pilot study with managers in the 
software industry to construct our measurement 
instrument and ensure validity, reliability as well as 
rigor of our main study’s results [22]. Therefore, we 
adapted existing scales to the platform context. Refined 
items were again evaluated in a pre-test to ascertain 
that our survey items were interpreted unambiguously 
(see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Measurement scales 
 
 
Our constructs display evidence of reliability with 
Cronbach’s α greater than .85 for all variables. 
Confirmatory factor analysis yielded adequately high 
factor loadings concerning the latent constructs and 
allows us to assert discriminant validity as the Fornell 
Larcker criterion is fulfilled for all our study variables 
[13]. To test common method bias, we conducted 
Harman’s one-factor test [27]. The unrotated factor 
solution resulted in 8 factors explaining 85 percent of 
the variance (33 percent was the largest variance 
explained by one factor). Thus, common method bias 
is unlikely to be a problem. 
 
3.3. Fuzzy-set QCA 
 
We analyzed the obtained data via Fuzzy-set QCA 
(FsQCA). FsQCA draws on a set-theoretic approach 
which emphasizes the effects of the whole rather than 
its pieces. Hence, it explicitly acknowledges the 
multidimensionality of research cases [12]. Thereby, 
FsQCA evaluates the predictive power of the 
potentially possible configurations of study variables 
based on measures of consistency and coverage. 
Consistency values are analogous to correlation 
estimates in statistical methods. This indicator displays 
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to which degree cases that share a certain combination 
of conditions agree in leading to a given outcome [28]. 
Coverage on the other hand represents the degree to 
which a configuration accounts for the instances of an 
outcome. Thus, coverage values are analogous to R-
square values in regression analysis. For a single 
configuration, FsQCA calculates two different 
coverage values. The raw coverage provides a measure 
which displays in what percentage of the cases in the 
dataset this particular configuration can be observed 
[28]. As a single case may be covered by different 
configurations, it is useful to additionally calculate 
unique coverage. This indicator estimates the 
percentage of cases that display membership in the 
configuration of interest, but not in any other 
configuration in the solution set [28]. In order to detect 
configurations which are consistent to the outcome in 
question, FsQCA comprises three steps [28]: 
calibration, construction of truth tables, truth table 
analysis. 
The first step is calibration. As FsQCA construes 
configurations of conditional variables as sets in which 
research cases can be either member or non-member, 
calibration of the variable measures is necessary in 
order to obtain the cases’ degree of memberships in a 
certain set of conditions (here, e.g. membership in the 
group of firms with highly decoupled apps). Thus, all 
construct measures must be transformed from Likert 
scale values into fuzzy set membership scores which 
range between 0 and 1 with 0 indicating full non-
membership, 1 indicating full membership and 0.5 
representing the crossover point [32]. Within this work, 
we choose the observed maximum and minimum 
values within the sample to specify full membership 
and full non-membership for all variables and the 
calculated scale midpoint (median of observed values) 
as cross-over point. This is analogous to the calibration 
approach by Fiss [12]. The three values gained through 
this procedure served as input variables for the 
calibration procedure in the FsQCA software program 
[28] which transforms all Likert scale measures to set 
membership scores. 
The construction and refinement of truth tables 
represent the second step of analysis. A truth table is a 
matrix of all possible configurations of antecedent 
conditions. In our case, it consists of 32 rows (in 
general 2
k
, where k is the number of conditions 
observed [28]). Subsequently, the truth table is refined 
so that it fits the requirements of FsQCA. In the 
refinement procedure, each possible configuration is 
assessed based on two criteria: frequency and 
consistency. The frequency criterion captures how 
many empirical cases with a membership score of 
more than 0.5 in a certain configuration are necessary 
in order to include the configuration in further analysis. 
The standard threshold for frequency in medium-sized 
samples is 1 meaning that every configuration that 
exists in the empirical dataset will be part of the 
analysis [32]. The consistency criterion captures if a 
truth table row displays a consistent subset of the 
outcome and should outreach a value of at least .8 [28]. 
In this work, we choose a rather conservative threshold 
of .9. Overall, 32 cases involved configurations 
exceeding the frequency threshold of which 7 also 
exceeded the consistency threshold for asset 
specificity, 17 for behavioral uncertainty, 18 for 
technological uncertainty and 17 for market 
uncertainty. 
Finally, in the third step, the truth tables are 
analyzed based on Boolean algebra. Counterfactual 
analysis represents the basic principle of this step. The 
approach applies the Quine-McCluskey algorithm that 
identifies combinations of factors which consistently 
lead to a certain outcome by stripping away factors that 
are inconsistently present or absent concerning the 
particular outcome [12]. By doing so, the algorithm 
excludes conditions that are no essential part of a 
sufficient configuration for the respective outcome. As 
a result, the analysis produces two distinct solutions: 
the parsimonious solution and the intermediate 
solution. The parsimonious solution includes all 
simplifying assumptions derived from counterfactuals 
in contrast to the intermediate solution which only 
includes simplifying assumptions based on easy 
counterfactuals. Hence, the intermediate solution 
always represents a subset of the parsimonious solution 
which passed a more thorough reduction procedure. In 
other words, the data thus provides strong empirical 
evidence for the causality of these conditions present in 
the parsimonious solution. This solution thus displays 
the causal core of a configuration, while the causal 
periphery includes all conditions present in the 
intermediate solution [12]. 
 
4. Results  
 
The FsQCA approach yielded a number of 
solutions with considerably high consistency that 
explains a substantive proportion of complementors’ 
potential hazards. Tables 2 and 3 present the results for 
high asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty, and 
technological uncertainty and market uncertainty 
whereas Tables 4 and 5 display configurations which 
lead to the non-existence of those hazards. We 
followed the notation for solution tables by Ragin [28] 
with black circles (“•”) displaying the presence of a 
condition, crossed-out circles (“⊗”) indicating its 
absence and blank spaces indicate that a condition may 
be either present or absent. Large Circles thereby refer 
to core conditions, small circles indicate peripheral 
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conditions. The solutions are grouped on the basis of 
their core conditions. 
 
4.1. Configurations for high levels of hazard 
 
There are two different core configurations 
resulting in high asset specificity, three resulting in 
behavioral uncertainty, four resulting in technological 
uncertainty and three resulting in market uncertainty 
(some core configurations split-up into several 
permutations, these are marked by lower case letters). 
Consistency for the single configurations ranges from 
.86 to .94, acceptable levels [28]. The overall 
consistency values for the four contextual hazards are 
.90, .85, .85, and .87. Roughly spoken, overall these 
values display the degree to which the configurations 
consistently result in the outcome of interest. 
Therefore, we can say that these five solutions 
consistently result in high levels of hazard with 90, 85, 
85 and 87 percent. Overall solution coverage 
represents the extent to which the configurations cover 
cases of the respective outcome [28]. Hence, it 
explains what percentage of membership for the 
outcome set can be captured by the configurations of 
conditions. Thus, cases with high levels of asset 
specificity, behavioral uncertainty, technological 
uncertainty and market uncertainty are covered to 52, 
79, 82 and 82 percent respectively by the solutions 
presented in the tables.  
 
Table 2. Configurations for high asset specificity 
and behavioral uncertainty 
 
By comparing the configurations across all four 
dimensions of hazards, we found four strong patterns: 
Pattern I) If platform owners heavily rely on 
mechanisms of input control, this causes high levels of 
asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty and 
technological uncertainty from a complementor’s 
viewpoint. In contrast, concerning market uncertainty 
both its presence (solution 1) and absence (solution 3) 
are core elements of configurations. 
Pattern II) The only configuration which 
consistently lead to asset specificity, behavioral 
uncertainty and technological uncertainty involves the 
presence of input control, the absence of clan control 
mechanisms and the presence of app decoupling. 
Hence, under such forms of platform control, the 
complementor may be unable to lower transaction 
costs based on own design choices in the 
microarchitecture. 
Pattern III) With exception to solutions 2a and 2b 
for market uncertainty, hazards from the 
complementor’s perspective are always associated with 
the platform owner ensuring itself a portion of power 
within the governance form. This may be either via 
input control or via centralized decision rights.  
Pattern IV) Third-party developers’ choice to 
standardize and formalize the interface of their apps 
towards a single platform may under certain 
circumstances be a necessary mechanism to reduce the 
uncertainty they face when interacting with the 
platform. However, this comes at the cost of specific 
investments in their relationship with the platform, so 
that there may be a trade-off between reducing 
uncertainty via standardization and vice versa 
increasing asset specificity by doing so. 
 
Table 3. Configurations for high technological 
and market uncertainty 
 
 
4.2. Configurations for low levels of hazard 
 
There are two different core configurations 
resulting in low levels of asset specificity, three 
resulting in low levels of behavioral uncertainty, four 
resulting in low levels of technological uncertainty and 
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one resulting in low level market uncertainty. 
Consistency for the single configurations ranges from 
.88 to .93. The overall consistency values for the four 
contextual hazards are .88, .89, .90, and .93. Overall 
solution coverage for low levels of asset specificity, 
behavioral uncertainty, technological uncertainty and 
market uncertainty is at .49, .80, .84 and .59.  
 
Table 4. Configurations for low asset specificity 
and behavioral uncertainty 
 
 
By comparing the configurations across all four 
dimensions of hazards, we found four strong patterns: 
Pattern V) Clan control seems to be an effective 
mechanism to reduce complementors’ transaction 
costs. Its attenuating effect appears if a) either input 
control is low or decision making is delegated (for 
behavioral and technological uncertainty), b) if 
decision rights are centralized and input is controlled 
but concurrently app decoupling and interface 
standardization are present (behavioral uncertainty), 
and c) if the complementor resigns to standardize its 
platform-app interfaces (asset specificity). 
Pattern VI) If clan control is absent, low levels of 
hazard are still possible, but only if either the 
complementor modularizes its app architecture via 
decoupling or the platform owner does not draw on 
governance mechanisms which grant it power, namely 
centralized decision making and input control. 
Pattern VII) The absence of both centralized 
decision rights and input control reduces behavioral 
and market uncertainty from the complementor’s 
viewpoint. 
Pattern VIII) Non-modularization of the app 
microarchitecture seems to be necessary for low levels 
of asset specificity whereas low perceived market 
uncertainty is only achieved consistently if 
modularization in the form of app decoupling and 
standardized interfaces is present. 
 
Table 5. Configurations for low technological 
and market uncertainty 
 
 
5. Insights and implications 
 
Our primary objective in this paper is to analyze the 
antecedents of complementors’ transaction costs in 
platform ecosystems. In particular, we attempt to shed 
light on how the interplay between the architecture of 
an extension and the different governance mechanisms 
of platform owners facilitate or diminish the 
emergence of hazards in the relational context which 
are likely to raise third-party developers’ transaction 
costs. 
The results of our configurational analysis provide 
several interesting insights for both theory and 
practice. First, while platform owners might benefit 
from governance mechanisms which grant them power 
and authority over the development of the ecosystem, 
these mechanisms are quite likely to confront the 
platforms complementors with several hazards. 
Compared to the centralization of decision rights, input 
control seems to be a particularly important 
mechanism. If input control is applied, all types of 
hazards are likely to be high. However, if input control 
is absent, all types of hazards are likely to be low. The 
screening and admission procedures of the platform 
owner consequently require specific investments to 
meet such criteria. Furthermore, such control fosters 
uncertainty as it gives the platform owner a certain 
amount of power. Input control therefore represents an 
essential parameter which platform owners should 
calibrate carefully in order to balance own as well as 
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complementors’ costs and thus ensure healthiness and 
robustness of the ecosystem.  
Second, the results indicate that clan control may 
be an effective mechanism for the platform owner to 
lower complementors’ hazards. Such norms, mutual 
values and goals as soft power instrument help to lower 
asset specific, behavioral and technological 
uncertainty. If the platform owner abstains from 
applying just one of those two power ensuring 
mechanisms, then clan control is a sufficient way to 
keep hazards and consequently complementor´s 
transaction costs low. Hence, clan control might to a 
certain degree be a suitable measure to lower the 
negative effects of input control and decision rights 
centralization. 
Finally, the complementor itself can influence the 
emergence of hazards within the transaction 
atmosphere. However, the impact of modularizing the 
design of own apps is limited and comes at costs. On 
the one hand, app decoupling and standardized 
interfaces may help to reduce behavioral, technological 
and market uncertainty. This can be explained as app 
modularization reduces the effects of technological 
changes within the platform on a single app and 
ensures that the complementor can counteract to 
opportunistic behavior and market changes quickly. 
Still, these effects only apply constantly if input control 
is not present or if clan control is applied. Hence, 
design choices by the complementor possess rather low 
ability to overcome the effects of design choices made 
by the platform owner. On the other hand, our data 
provides evidence for app decoupling and interface 
standardization to be both necessary and sufficient 
conditions for high levels of asset specificity. This 
finding seems counterintuitive and calls for further 
investigations. 
In all, we extend theory on platform ecosystems in 
three ways. First, this study contributes to previous 
work on factors that influence ecosystem dynamics [8] 
by extending current perspectives on costs. Therefore, 
we propose TCT, which IS research traditionally uses 
in research on outsourcing [2, 41], as a valuable 
theoretical lens for platform management. Second, we 
investigate the antecedents of such costs by examining 
the influence of the interplay between modular systems 
and different modes of platform governance on four 
types of hazards which may arise in the relation 
between complementor and platform. Third and 
finally, we provide a fresh theoretical and 
methodological perspective on this topic by 
acknowledging the configurational nature of platforms 
and apply FsQCA to detect meaningful combinations 
of the input variables. We hope that these 
configurations may serve as holistic templates which 
will stimulate academic discussion and prove useful for 
executives in software development and platform 
managers. 
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